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A variety of safety protective devices (SPDs) are currently available on the machinery safety market. SPD complexity 
and cost depend on the safety feature implemented as required for a specific piece of machinery in its working environment. 
However, one type of inexpensive SPD is mandatory for many types of machines: the emergency stop device (ESD). This 
paper introduces a novel ESD recently developed by the authors. This electronic ESD is capable of automatically 
performing emergency stop actions as commanded by a suitable external supervisory safety system connected to it, which 
may replace or reinforce the human action expected for the provision of safety. In addition, the device allows integration 
with any emergency stop circuit already designed for machinery by means of configurable features. Both practical design 
and implementation issues are discussed in detail through a fully exemplified concept-design-prototype-validation 
procedure. 
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Introduction 
Machine safety is a growing technical discipline with 
a solid foundation in the development of so-called 
electrical and electronic safety protective devices 
(SPDs). According to the principles of machine safety 
integration given in standard ISO 12100
(1)
, SPDs are 
designed to avoid or at least mitigate those risks 
associated with a particular human-machinery interaction, 
which cannot be eliminated from the design stage. 
Generally speaking, a set of SPDs can be adapted 
to a machine to minimise its associated risks. 
However, ISO 12100 establishes a mandatory SPD 
for use in almost any industrial machinery, except for 
portable and hand-guided types—the emergency stop 
device (ESD).  
An ESD is a manually operated type of control that 
provides an emergency stop function, i.e., it stops 
the machine as soon as possible without creating 
additional hazards. It consists of two parts: an 
emergency stop switch (ESS), and a manual 
mechanical actuator that operates on the ESS. ESDs 
are typically classified according to its actuator into 
three types
2
: emergency stop buttons (ESBs), hand 
rope/cable pull switches, and foot pedal operated 
switches. The most common type of ESB is a red 
mushroom-shaped push-button attached to a bright 
yellow housing for improved visibility. ESDs are 
electrically connected in series to a single-function 
machinery circuit called emergency stop circuit 
(ESC). ESDs comply with international standards ISO 
13850
(3)





A hierarchical supervisory safety system (HSSS)
5
 
has been recently developed for active protection of 
workers using a relevant group of semi-automatic 
industrial machinery, including Cartesian cutters and 
welders. This HSSS combines visual worker detection 
and machine cycle tracking for safety purposes, while 
seamlessly accessing the machine’s ESC.
5,6
 
For achieving this active sensing principle, a 
general purpose electronic ESD (e-ESD) has also 
been developed.
7
 It is devised to actuate in its 
intended behaviour (i.e., to latch in or release) in 
response to external commands delivered from a 
HSSS via a standard communication link. Similar to 
conventional ESD, it also provides manual operation 
under the requirements of ISO 13850.
3
  
This paper concentrates on the main design and 
implementation issues to consider when building an e-
ESD prototype, with a stress on ease of customisation 
for use in non-specific machine ESCs. 
Materials and Methods 
Concept Design 
The concept design scheme of a general-purpose 
electronic ESD (e-ESD) is depicted in Fig. 1. Its main 
feature is to provide automatic activation and release 








HSSS via a non-specific standard bus (e.g., RS-485, 
RS-232, and USB). Its conceptual design allows the 
device to be easily adapted for use on different 
machines, as its implementation is not limited to a 
specific technology. The main differences of this device 
compared to conventional ESD are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Wireless communication between HSSS and  
e-ESD is completely discarded from the design stage, 
as these means have been shown in practice to be 
much more prone to electromagnetic interference 
(EMI) issues than standard wired solutions. EMI is an 
unwanted, but expected, guest in industrial environments 
that drastically hampers radio link reliability.
8
 
To reduce system complexity, the e-ESD is 
designed to be powered from the bus. It can also be 
operated manually, similar to conventional ESD. An 
internal control unit manages HSSS communication 
and supervises the machine ESC. It continuously 
detects and stores ESC status without delay, so it can 
readily send both the ESC and the internal states to 
the external HSSS via the communication bus. It also 
provides suitable connections for visual and/or audio 
information devices that report these readings. 
Two key elements are connected to the machine 
ESC in Fig. 1: a relay with its contact in series with 
other machine ESDs, and an instantaneous current 
sensing system that determines the emergency stop 
condition. Its operation principle follows. If no 
current is detected at the ESC, the emergency stop 
function is active, i.e., at least one of the machine 
ESDs, or the e-ESD itself, is latched (relay contact in 
open state). Otherwise, the machine is in normal 
operating mode, since each ESD connected to the 
ESC, including the e-ESD, has its contacts closed, 
allowing current to flow in the ESC. 
The communication protocol between the e-ESD 
and the HSSS is asynchronous and command-based, 
in a typical master-slave configuration. From the       
e-ESD side, these commands fall into two categories: 
reception (RX) and transmission (TX).  
On the one hand, the RX commands received  
from the HSSS include the following action requests: 
ESD automatic latch, ESD automatic release, and 
ESC status. On the other hand, the TX commands 
delivered to the HSSS include the ESC status report,  
as requested by the HSSS, and the following 
unrequested reports: ESC emergency status; ESC 
back-to-normal status after emergency status; ESC 
emergency status as self-activated by the e-ESD, 
including its push-button; and ESC back-to-normal 
status as self-activated by the e-ESD, including its 
push-button. 
In short, RX commands comprise activation, 
deactivation and request for information commands, 
while TX commands report data previously requested 
by the HSSS, or alarm conditions without request. 
 
Design Methods 
Several design issues must be considered before 
implementing a working e-ESD prototype. First, a 
suitable method must be chosen to measure the 
current flowing in the ESC. From the comprehensive 
review of current sensing techniques of Ziegler et al.
9
, 
two simple sensing techniques stand out among 
others: shunt resistor and Hall effect. 
Shunt resistor method causes power loss in the 
current path, limiting its use to low current applications. 
However, it is by far the simplest and cheapest detection 
method, allowing both AC and DC measurements. On 
the other hand, current sensors based on the Hall 
effect avoid resistive losses since their output voltage 
is driven by a magnetic field. Moreover, they are a 
robust and affordable sensing solution for harsh 
environments. However, they add some complexity 
 
 
Fig. 1 — Concept design scheme of an electronic ESD7 
 




Activation method Manual Manual / Electronic 
Release method Manual Manual / Electronic 
ESC status readout No Yes 
Remote activation No Yes 
Remote release No Yes 
Communication bus No Yes 
 




and cost due to the use of magnetic field concentrators 
(toroidal cores) to reduce misalignment errors.
9
 
In an e-ESD, the current sensor module must 
provide ESC current measurements with sufficient 
resolution so that the control unit can reliably 
determine ESC status. Since the standardised ESC DC 
limit is 2 A
4
, and high-resolution measurements are 
not required to assess ON/OFF circuit status, the 
shunt resistor method is our preferred choice. 
Now, as the e-ESD is connected in series with the 
machine ESC, the equivalent total circuit resistance 
RT will be increased. Typically, the practical range of 
values for RT is limited by the electrical characteristics 
of a monitoring safety relay (MSR), which properly 
initiates the machinery emergency stop function. 
MSR working limits can be expressed as minimum 
current IESCmin and voltage VESCmin, which in turn 
determine the maximum allowable ESC resistance, 












   … (1) 
 
where VCC is the ESC voltage supply and RR is the 
MSR internal resistance. This deviation from RR is 
due to both the length and conductance of the ESC 
wiring, and the equivalent series resistance of the 
released ESDs connected to the ESC. 
When the e-ESD is inserted into the machine ESC, 
the combined resistance of its relay contact and shunt 
resistor (RS) is upper-bounded to 
 
lim maxS T ESCR R R   … (2) 
 
where RESC is the equivalent series resistance of the 
initial ESC in its release state, and RTmax is given by 
Eq. (1). Typically, high RS values are preferred to 
improve the available signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at 
the current sensor. Moreover, the e-ESD response 
should be as independent as possible of the exact 
location of the ESC insertion point, since this 
insertion point may be favoured by e.g. accessibility 
factors. 
To achieve better SNR and insertion point 
independence, a differential voltage measurement 
across the shunt resistor (VS) from an I/V converter  
is often preferred (see Fig. 2). These converters 
generally feature an adjustable gain AV that modifies 
the analogue-to-digital converter (ADC) input voltage 
VO, where ADC is a required component for reading 
data from the control unit. 
By choosing a shunt resistor value RS for the circuit 













 … (3) 
 
Hence, setting RS = RSmin yields a minimum I/V 
converter output VOmin to obtain adequate digital 
current measurement resolution at the ADC. On  
the other hand, the shunt resistor also has an upper 
limit value RSmax for which VO is within the ADC 













 … (4) 
 
where VAD = VADP – VADN is the ADC voltage 
operating range. 
Finally, the ESC insertion point also affects the  
I/V converter common mode input voltage VScm. 
Therefore, both positive (VCCP) and negative (VCCN) 
I/V converter power supply limits must be checked to 
ensure proper sensing circuit operation. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Implementation 
In this section, we discuss the implementation 
details of a fully functional and low-cost e-ESD 
prototype, in particular, those related to the available 
prototyping options derived from Fig. 1. 
First, selecting a USB bus for HSSS 
communication provides the designer with some 
advantages, including direct power supply across the 
bus and faster prototype development and testing. In 
this work, we selected the USB development kit from 
microChip.
10
 It contains a USB-powered high-
performance PIC18F47J53 microcontroller, including 
a 10-bit ADC, a push-button and two high-efficiency 
 
 
Fig. 2 — Circuit for differential current measurement 
 




LEDs. While these features are all basic elements of 
the e-ESD (see Fig. 1), other required components 
cannot be directly implemented on this kit. Thus, we 
developed an additional PCB to incorporate the 
remaining features, namely a relay, a resistor-based 
current sensor with I/V converter, signal conditioning 
circuits, ESC connection terminals, and an inverter for 
controlling the I/V converter power supply limits. 
The USB development kit was attached to our 
custom board with a header connector, yielding  
the compact two-layer assembly shown in Fig. 3.  
The relay drive circuit was designed to keep its 
contacts openwhen power fails, indicating an emergency 
stop condition. Finally, the current sensor was 
implemented with the TSC103 chip
11
 as its principal 
component, as it provides four different gains AV. 
The e-ESD prototype was programmed to detect 
three emergency conditions: EM1, initiated by the 
HSSS; EM2, initiated by on-board push-button 
actuation; and EM3, initiated by activation of other 
ESD connected to the ESC. These emergency conditions 
were visually coded on the kit’s LEDs (L1 and L2).  
The device switches between two states: latched 
(relay contact open) and released (relay contact closed). 
Its operation was set as follows. The e-ESD starts by 
default in its latched state by activating EM1 and 
EM2. In this way, a safe start of the machine is 
guaranteed. To change this initial state, the e-ESD 
requires the HSSS to command a deactivation 
message EM1, informing the absence of risk in the 
machinery workplace, and a manual on-board push-
button actuation to deactivate EM2. On meeting these 
two conditions, the machine ESC will allow machine 
operation when each ESD connected to the ESC is in 
its released state (EM3 deactivated). 
After initialization, the e-ESD enters a continuous 
operation mode in which, according to foreseeable 
events, it switches between its latched and released 
states. In its released state, its behaviour is as follows: 
 ESC current is shortly measured at each processing 
cycle.  
 If ESC current is below a threshold T, EM3 
activates (both L1 and L2 blink). Otherwise, EM3 
deactivates.  
 The e-ESD switches to its latched status if the 
HSSS reports a dangerous condition (EM1) or if 
the on-board push-button is activated (EM2). 
 If no emergency condition is detected, both L1 
and L2 remain off.  
The operation of the e-ESD in its latched state is as 
follows: 
 The relay is inactive (open), which disables  
EM3 assessment. 
 Latched status is indicated by powered L1  
(EM1 on) and/ or L2 (EM2 on). 
 The e-ESD changes to its released state if the 
HSSS reports a safe condition (EM1 off) and/ or 
if the integrated push-button is manually 
deactivated (EM2 off). 
 Any change in EM2 condition is automatically 
signalled to the HSSS. 
 
Verification and Validation 
After completing the design and implementation 
stages, verification and validation tests required to 
configure the e-ESD to meet the ESC requirements of 
the test machine. We chose to test our prototype on a 
plasma cutting machine installed in a controlled 
laboratory. The ESC of this machine contains three 
conventional ESBs mounted on different locations for 
easier operator access. One terminal of this ESC is 
connected to the chassis ground, while the other 
terminal is powered from a XPSATE safety relay.
12
 
The operating parameters of the machine ESC prior to 
testing were as follows: VCC = 21.0 V, VESCmin = 17.0 V, 
RTmax = 2100 Ω, and RESC = 1726.9 Ω.  
As discussed in the previous section, the ESC 
insertion point should provide the machine operator 
with safe and easy access while introducing minimal 
variation to the ESC. In this case, the chassis ground 
terminal was chosen. Also, since our prototype is 
USB powered, this choice required the use of an 
additional DC/DC converter to extend the I/V 
converter input common-mode range VScm. 
Using Eq. (2) with initial ESC parameters revealed 
that RS values below RSlim ≈ 370 Ω ensured a safe 
 
 
Fig. 3 — A low-cost e-ESD prototype 




operation of the ESC. However, in order to obtain 
adequate digital current resolution on the 10-bit ADC, 
VOmin was chosen as half of the ADC’s voltage 
operating range, VAD = 3.3 V, providing a maximum 
resolution loss of 1 bit. This configuration proved to 
be an acceptable value for assessing significant 
current variations in the ESC. 
Since the chosen I/V converter
 11
 allows using four 
conversion gains AV, we obtained the set of RSmin and 
RSmax values in Table 2 using Eqs (3) and (4). These 
data show that actual RS limits are normally imposed 
by the I/V converter, regardless of its gain. In this 
case, we chose AV = 20 and RS = 10 Ω, yielding  
VO values over 73% VAD. 
Next, to test and validate our prototype, we linked 
it to a PC via USB to simulate a generic HSSS. 
Verification tests ensure meeting design specifications, 
whereas validation tests ensure compliance with the 
operational needs of the intended use.
13
 We devised 
two groups of tests for verification and validation: 
operational and response time tests. 
We repeated 1,000 times the following operational 
tests, obtaining zero faults: 
 Power switch on (USB). Outcome: start in latched state. 
 Power switch off (USB). Outcome: change to 
latched state. 
 Release command (HSSS). Outcome: keep (all 
EMs off) or change (EM3 on) to released state. 
 Release command (on-board push-button). 
Outcome: keep (EM3 on) or change (all EMs off) 
to released state.  
 Random, single EM condition in released state. 
Outcome: change to latched state; send EM2/ 
EM3 on to HSSS; L1/L2 on. 
 Random, multiple simultaneous EM conditions in 
released state. Outcome: change to latched state; 
send EM2/EM3 on to HSSS; L1/L2 on. 
 Random, single EM condition deactivation in 
latched state. Outcome: change to released state; 
send EM2 off to HSSS; L1/L2 off. 
The results obtained from these operational tests 
show high prototype reliability in every foreseeable 
situation. 
Finally, we also measured the following prototype 
response times: 
 Supervised latch time (TSL): timespan between a 
received USB latch command and e-ESD relay 
deactivation, comprising two non-overlapping 
intervals: 
o TSL1: from latch command reception to internal 
relay deactivation command delivery. 
o TSL2: from internal relay deactivation command 
delivery to hardware relay deactivation. 
 Supervised release time (TSR): time interval from 
reception of USB release command to e-ESD 
relay activation, also comprising two non-
overlapping intervals: 
o TSR1: from release command reception to 
internal relay activation command delivery. 
o TSR2: from internal relay activation command 
delivery to hardware relay activation. 
We measured a series of 100 response time tests 
using a Tektronix TDS2024B digital oscilloscope, 
obtaining the results provided in Table 3. TSL1 and TSR1 
response times were nearly constant since microprocessor 
execution cycles do not vary. Also, both relay 
deactivation and activation times (TSL2 and TSR2) were 
fairly accurate. Finally, the average total latch time 
(TSL) was 0.4 ms slower than average release time 
(TSR), both being much smaller than the nominal 
response time of the XPSATE safety relay
12
 installed 
at the machine control system. From these results, our 
developed prototype shows high reliability and a fast 
and accurate response. Moreover, the proposed 
verification and validation tests proved to be adequate 
for their intended purpose.  
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we discuss the practical aspects  
of designing and implementing an e-ESD prototype  
in detail, from the initial concept to the final 
verification and validation stage. From a low-cost 
prototyping perspective, our design choices highlight 
using USB kits for rapid development, the preference 
for shunt resistor method for current sensing, and the 
development of custom PCBs to obtain a compact and 
configurable product. Measured response times on our 
Table 2 — RS limit values vs I/V converter gain AV 
AV 20.00 25.00 50.00 100.00 
RSmax(Ω) 6.82 5.45 2.72 1.36 
RSmin(Ω) 13.70 10.94 5.45 2.72 










TSL1 0.003664 ~ 0 
TSL2 1.1815 0.0031 
TSL 1.1852 0.0031 
Release 
TSR1 0.003914 ~ 0 
TSR2 1.5918 0.0114 
TSR 1.5957 0.0114 
 




device were significantly lower than those of modern 
safety relays. This validates our design, since the 
processing delay is negligible in all foreseeable 
situations.  
Moreover, the modular structure used in 
prototyping makes studying future expansions and 
improvements a more flexible and cost-effective 
endeavour. Among these, the use of Hall effect 
sensors for current measurement is of particular 
interest. This method further facilitates e-ESD 
installation on longer and more complex ESCs, where 
the practical limits for RS are more restrictive. 
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